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orruption is difﬁcult to measure and even more difﬁcult to control—or so 
claims conventional wisdom. Benjamin Olken, economist and afﬁliate of the 
Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), devised a method to measure cor-
ruption and used it to evaluate alternative strategies to reduce corruption on an 
Indonesian road-building project. Two types of strategies were tried: encouraging 
community participation and increasing the probability of audits. The results 
may surprise both those who believe nothing can be done about established cor-
ruption and those who advocate participatory monitoring:
Traditional government audits reduced “missing expenditures” 
by eight percentage points. 
In some villages, road-building teams were told in advance that the of-
ﬁcial government audit agency would be auditing their work. Despite the 
bureaucracy’s reputation for corruption, these audits increased legitimate 
expenditures on roads.
On average, community monitoring did not reduce corruption.
In some villages, hundreds of villagers were invited to “accountability meet-
ings” previously attended only by local elite; half of these groups were also 
given anonymous comment forms. Community participation had the larg-
est effect when invitations were distributed through schools, rather than 
by neighborhood elites. However, it only reduced missing labor costs, in 
which villagers often had a personal stake, and did not have any effect on 
missing materials costs. 
Corruption can be measured as “missing expenditures.” 
Olken trained engineers to examine a completed road and estimate how 
much had been spent to build it. Subtracting these estimated costs from 
the ofﬁcial recorded cost revealed missing expenditures: one measure of 
losses due to corruption.
Measuring corruption using perceptions can potentially be misleading. 
A survey of Indonesian villagers found that the correlation between their per-
ception of corruption and measured corruption is small and subject to biases. 
Estimating corruption based on perceptions may suggest the wrong policies.
C
2  Massachusetts Institute of Technology | ABDUL LATIF JAMEEL POVERTY ACTION LAB
Mixed Results 
for Community Participation
Although KDP requires public accountability meetings, 
in practice only village leaders participate. As part of 
a randomized controlled experiment involving 608 vil-
lages, to increase community participation Olken widely 
distributed invitations in some villages. In half of these, 
community members also received comment forms, ei-
ther from neighborhood heads or through schools.
The invitations did increase participation. On average, 
13.5 more non-elite villagers attended meetings, com-
ment forms were returned, and meeting attendees were 
slightly more likely to discuss corruption-related prob-
lems. A “process evaluation” therefore might ﬁ nd that 
participation worked, but, on average, it did not reduce 
missing expenditures.
Olken suggests two explanations. First, monitoring is 
a public good, and people are more likely to help when 
they beneﬁ t personally. Inviting many people did re-
duce missing labor expenses—often community mem-
bers worked on the roads—but had no effect on the 
much more important problem of missing materials 
expenses. Community participation promoted people’s 
own interests but not the public good. Second, this 
process can be captured by local elites. Even access 
and information may not be sufﬁ cient for grassroots 
actors to control corruption if those who beneﬁ t can 
control the process. This may be why of the four com-
munity participation strategies tested, comment cards 
distributed through schools, a “neutral” location, was 
the only treatment with a signiﬁ cant effect.
Background
An Indonesian government program supported by a loan from the World Bank, the Kecamatan Development Program 
(KDP) funds projects in about 15,000 villages each year. Each village receives an average of $8,800, which they often 
use to surface existing dirt roads.
Two checks on corruption are built into KDP. First, funds are paid to village “implementation teams” in three install-
ments. To receive the second and third payments, the teams must make accountability reports at an open village 
meeting. Second, each project has a 4 percent chance of being audited by an independent government agency. This 
study introduced two anti-corruption strategies: enhancing community participation and increasing government 
audits. Despite these measures, corruption accounts for more than 20 percent of reported budgets.
Government Audits Reduced 
Missing Expenditures
When corruption is considered pervasive throughout 
the auditing bureaucracy, can government audits 
help? Perhaps surprisingly, Olken’s randomized con-
trolled experiment proved that they can.
In about half of the villages Olken increased the prob-
ability of an audit from 4 percent to 100 percent; every 
implementation team in this group knew it was certain 
to be audited. These audits were performed by the same 
government agency that otherwise monitored KDP—an 
agency often considered corrupt.
On average, these audits decreased missing expendi-
tures by eight percentage points. Audits caused more 
materials to be legitimately used in building the roads 
but did not change reported prices.
Importantly, road-building elites responded to pri-
vate incentives. Audits increased nepotism, the hir-
ing of family members, and were most effective when 
ofﬁ cials faced elections soon.
Change in Missing Expenditures (%) by Group
Invitations Invitations & Comment Cards
Through Elites
Invitations & Comment Cards
Through Schools
Audits
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Cost Effectiveness of 
Government Audits
The audit treatment reduced missing expenditures 
but at the cost of conducting many more audits. How-
ever, even auditing 100 percent of the village projects 
proved cost effective.
Although audits cost $500 each, they improved roads 
by an average of $1,165 each. On the whole—even after 
factoring in all costs and transfers—villages were $245 
better off per average audit.
How to Measure Corruption
Ordinarily, researchers use “corruption perceptions” 
data: surveys of outside experts’ opinions on corrup-
tion. Even if these surveys actually measure corrup-
tion—and not other sources of dissatisfaction—they 
do so roughly at best.
Other research by Olken suggests that villagers’ per-
ceptions of corruption in their communities are sys-
tematically biased—for example, people think there 
is more corruption in ethnically diverse communities 
while in fact there isn’t. 
Corruption can sometimes be inferred even when it 
cannot be observed directly. Olken trained teams 
of engineers to estimate the cost of building a road. 
The engineering teams even built their own model 
roads to calibrate their measurement technique. The 
differences between their estimates and a village’s 
reported expenditures capture corruption: project 
funds “missing” from the road. 
While this procedure cannot pinpoint levels of corrup-
tion, it does measures differences—such as the differ-
ence in corruption between two villages, or between 
experimental groups. And although it only captures 
missing expenses—not, for example, nepotism—it re-
veals an effective anticorruption strategy and permits 
direct measurement of a previously elusive quantity. 
The Power of a Randomized Trial
These ﬁ ndings offer two surprises: the entrenched cor-
ruption in KDP was not invulnerable, but increased 
grassroots participation was not the solution. 
Because corruption can be widely embedded in a 
society, it is difﬁ cult to study anticorruption mea-
sures using traditional techniques. For example, 
when places with low corruption have active com-
munity groups, does that mean that the groups 
combat theft, or does a culture of openness both 
allow the groups to effectively operate and cause 
lower corruption?
A controlled experiment—in which each village 
was randomly assigned to receive audits, invita-
tions, both, or neither—allows these effects to be 
disentangled in a straightforward way because it 
draws the clearest line possible from cause to ef-
fect. Best of all, experiments permit the data to 
surprise us—as did Olken’s results.
Experimental Treatments by Group
Group Audit Probability Accountability Meetings Invitations Comment Cards Villages
Audit 100% ✓ 93
Participation I 4% ✓ ✓ 105
Participation II 4% ✓ ✓ ✓ 106
Audit & Participation I 100% ✓ ✓ 94
Audit & Participation II 100% ✓ ✓ ✓ 96
Control 4% ✓ 114
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Controlling Corruption: Government Auditing 
versus Community Participation in Indonesian 
Road Building
A randomized controlled trial of anticorruption strategies 
revealed surprising results:
Traditional government audits cost-effectively 
decreased “missing expenditures” by eight percentage points. 
On average, community monitoring did not reduce corruption. 
Corruption can be measured as “missing expenditures.” 
Measuring corruption using perceptions can potentially 
be misleading.
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